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MULTISTATE EXPORT TRADE PROMOTION UNDER THE
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982
I. INTRODUCTION
Unemployment and trade deficits are two critical factors which
influence the United States economy.' Both are related to the suc-
cess of United States exporters. Although the United States leads
the world in the dollar volume of exports, its share of the world
export market is declining.2 Enlarging the United States portion of
existing export sales through promotion would reverse this trend.'
Presently, one hundred corporations account for one half of all
exports of manufactured goods," yet an additional 20,000 small and
medium sized businesses might profitably enter the export mar-
ket.' The high costs of exporting, however, discourage the smaller
companies from expanding beyond their relatively safe domestic
markets. If smaller corporations sold their products abroad, export
trade would increase as a percentage of the United States gross
national product,6 which would reduce the trade deficit 7 and im-
'Unkovic & LaMont, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Invitation to Aggressive
Export Expansion, 87 DICK. L. Rav. 205, 213 (1983). In September 1982 United States un-
employment reached its highest percentage (10.4%) since the Depression of the 1930's. Id.
The United States trade deficit is expected to mushroom to an estimated 70 billion dollars
in 1983 from 40 billion dollars in 1982. See Atlanta Journal & Constitution, Apr. 3, 1983, at
J1, col. 1.
2 See Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 1, at 213. The dollar volume of United States ex-
ports giew from $181 billion in 1979 to $233.7 billion in 1981. The United States share of
the world market decreased from 18.2% in 1960 to 12.9% in 1981. Id.
3 See Mullen, Export Promotion: Legal and Structural Limitations on a Broad United
States Commitment, 7 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 57, 57 n.1 (1975). Government programs in
areas such as financing, insurance, taxation, commercial reporting, and market development
could increase a country's share in existing export markets rather than merely expand the
total export sales. Id.
See Hirschhorn, A Shot in the Arm for American Exports, 69 A.B.A.J. 746, 747 (1983).
' These smaller businesses lack the knowledge to find and evaluate foreign markets. They
also do not have the resources to secure credit necessary to exploit foreign sales opportuni-
ties. Id.
' Exports currently constitute 8.2% of the United States gross national product, the low-
est percentage in any industrialized nation. See Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 1, at 213.
" See Note, Export Promotion Through Tax Incentives: The Future of DISC Under the
GATT Subsidies Code, 20 VA. J. Irr'L L. 171 (1979). See also Causes and Consequences of
the U.S. Trade Deficit and Developing Problems in U.S. Exports: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1977)
(statement of Representative Charles A. Vanik, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Trade).
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prove overall employment statistics."
As one means of encouraging exports and improving United
States competitiveness in international commerce, Congress en-
acted the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETCA).9 The
ETCA centralizes responsibility for export trading companies
(ETCs) in the Department of Commerce, promotes participation of
banks in ETC formation, and allays fears concerning the applica-
tion of antitrust laws to ETCs.10 The ETCA also acknowledges the
importance of regional, state and local participation in the expan-
sion of United States export trade, especially through the develop-
ment of innovative regional export programs."
Many states could pool and effectively utilize their resources for
export trade promotion through multistate trading companies.
This Note analyzes the prospects for and obstacles to multistate
trading companies formed through a compact. It will address con-
stitutional impediments to multistate compacts which arise under
three clauses: 1) the compact clause; 2) the commerce clause; and
3) the supremacy clause. The Note proceeds on the basis of two
presumptions: the ETCA represents a congressional invitation to
states to form multistate exporting compacts, and the Act mini-
mizes the threat of federal preemption.
II. EXPORT PROMOTION
A. Federal Government
Foreign trade does not occur in a vacuum; rather, it has substan-
tial economic ramifications for those countries that trade with each
other.12 To create a favorable trade balance, each nation develops
0 See Export Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Pt. 2), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978)
(statement of Senator H. John Heinz, Member, Sen. Subcomm. on International Finance).
Between 1 in 7 and 1 in 10 of all the people employed in the United States work in export-
related jobs. See also 128 CONG. REc. S13,115 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (remarks of Sen.
Heinz). Over the past 10 years, one-third of all new jobs in the United States were created
through exports.
9 The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (Title I), 12 U.S.C. §§372, 635a-4, 1841, 1843 (Title II),
15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (Title III), 15 U.S.C. § 7 (Title IV)) [hereinafter cited as ETCA.
'0 See Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 1, at 213. United States businessmen perceive the
antitrust laws to be ambiguous, confusing, and expensive obstacles to exporting activities.
Id. at 214. See also ETCA, supra note 9, § 4001.
ETCA, supra note 9, § 4001.
See generally Williams & Baliga, The U.S. Export Trading Company Act of 1982:
Nature and Evaluation, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 224, 224 (1983); Unkovic & LaMont, supra
note 1, at 213-14; Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The
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policies to promote and protect its own exporters. The United
States implements policies encouraging foreign trade through tax
laws, federal programs and trade regulations.13 The Federal Gov-
ernment not only promotes exporting but regulates it through li-
censing. All exports from the United States require government
authorization." The commerce clause 0 enables Congress to regu-
late trade; with this power, the Government can shape export pol-
icy to benefit the United States both domestically and abroad."
Domestic fiscal policies can affect the amount of foreign trade of
a country. Through tax incentives,1 7 the Federal Government urges
industries to engage in export activities and protects them from
double taxation of profits earned overseas.18 Tax policies influence
how a corporation will sell its products: either through foreign sub-
sidiaries or directly from the United States. 9
The Domestic International Sales Corporation System (DISC)' 0
represents a major tax incentive program aimed specifically at ex-
History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1, 149-56 (1983); U.S. Trade Policy: Administration and Other Public Agencies, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 173 (1981) (statement of William H. Morris, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Trade
Development, Department of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The creation of
new jobs and employment stability is directly linked to expanded United States exports. Id.
"' See Hearings, supra note 12, at 175-81. Within the Department of Commerce, the In-
ternational Trade Administration (ITA), the Trade Development Unit, and the Foreign
Commercial Service are responsible for export trade promotion. The Departments of Agri-
culture and State perform similar promotion functions. The Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions for Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) represent one of the major tax
incentives to exporters. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. The Webb-Pomerene
Act, dating from 1918, was probably the last major legislative attempt to improve export
performance before passage of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982. See infra notes
40-44 and accompanying text.
" Note, Export Licensing: Uncoordinated Trade Repression, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMe. L.
333, 342 (1979). The most important and pervasive legislation regulating export trade is the
Export Administration Act of 1979. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 12, at 116-19.
"o The domestic benefits of a strong export policy have already been mentioned. See
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. The export performance of United States industry
is a significant factor in shaping the attitudes of foreign governments toward the United
States and in the achievement of United States foreign policy objectives. See H.R. REP. No.
637, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2431,
2432 (hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 637].
" See generally U.S. Trade Policy: Private Sector, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1982) (state-
ment of Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Chairman, Emergency Committee for American Trade).
"8 Id. at 16.
" Mullen, supra note 3, at 80.
" See generally I.R.C. §§ 911-997 (1982).
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porters."1 Congress enacted DISC for the express purpose of pro-
moting exports by equalizing the tax treatment of exporters and
corporations which sell goods through foreign subsidiaries.22 To
take advantage of the DISC tax deferral provisions, a company
must satisfy seven requirements.23 The formation of a DISC inevi-
tably permits United States companies to lower the prices of their
products traded internationally, not only because of immediate tax
savings but also because the companies can accrue a fund of inter-
est-free, low-cost capital for reinvestment in export activities.2 4
Tax deferral directly augments the advantages which Export-Im-
port Bank (Eximbank) programs provide as a part of the inte-
grated federal policy to foster expansion of exports.25 Eximbank
funding ensures that United States exporters do not lose sales be-
cause their customers lack credit.26 Eximbank gives long term buy-
" See Note, supra note 7, at 177 n.34. Other provisions which encourage export activity
include I.R.C. §§ 951-964 which allow United States companies to defer payment of taxes on
the income of foreign subsidiaries engaged in either the original production or ultimate sale
of goods until repatriation of earnings. Id.
"See Mullen, supra note 3, at 81. Congress also hoped to provide United States export-
ers with incentives similar to those provided by foreign nations which use tax policies as
export promotion devices. Id.
" See Note, supra note 7, at 179-80. These requirements are: 1) a DISC must be a United
States corporation; 2) for each taxable year, 95% of the DISC's gross receipts must consti-
tute "qualified export receipts"; 3) DISCs must maintain a minimum capital of $2500 at all
times; 4) the corporation can have only one class of stock (voting common stock); 5) all
shareholders must affirmatively elect DISC status; 6) the DISC must maintain separate
books and records and have a bank account separate from its parent corporation; and 7)
corporations with a special status under the tax laws generally cannot qualify as DISCs. Id.
" See id. at 183. Critics have questioned the use of tax incentives to stimulate exports.
See, e.g., arguments presented against DISC in Note, supra note 7, at 190-98. Opponents
argue that small businesses, the target of recent export promotion activities, are often una-
ble to take advantage of DISC provisions. Cf. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982:
Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-59 (1981) (statement of Jay
Angoff, Staff Attorney, Congressional Watch) [hereinafter cited as Hearings and Markup].
Mr. Angoff argues for the repeal of DISC because it is an "anachronism in a world of flexible
exchange rates." Id. at 57. See also Note, supra note 7, at 198-207. Tax practices such as
DISC have been questioned closely during multinational trade discussions concerning the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The DISC program of tax deferral argua-
bly constitutes an export subsidy which the GATT subsidies code prohibits. See Agreement
on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, CIV, CCIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. No. MTN/NTM/N/236 (1979), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 341-410 (1979).
'5 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 635-635n (1982); see also Mullen, supra note 3, at 82.
6 Note, The Exporting Process: Some Considerations for Practitioners, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 408, 424 (1978). Eximbank was created in 1934 and became a federal agency in
1935. It is capitalized with federal funds. Id. at 424 n.82.
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ers' credits to foreign purchasers of United States exports 27 and
encourages private capital participation in export ventures with
guaranteed repayment of loans .2  Administering over twenty pro-
grams,29 Eximbank plays an important role in export financing.
Eximbank was created 0 as one of many federal agencies which
facilitate exports. Congress has also vested divergent responsibili-
ties in executive departments, agencies, councils and offices such as
the Departments of Commerce, State, Agriculture and Treasury."1
The Department of Commerce, for instance, has general statutory
authority over domestic and international trade promotion.3 2 On
the other hand, the Department of State controls all overseas trade
operations." Internal offices, such as the International Trade Ad-
ministration (ITA) and Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), help
the Department of Commerce achieve its export promotion objec-
tives.84 Some Department of State foreign service officers work in
the FCS to assist the Department of Commerce in gathering trade
information."
One informational program which the Departments of Com-
merce and State sponsor jointly is the Trade Opportunities Pro-
gram (TOP). TOP transmits specific export opportunities (trade
leads) to United States firms." Trade leads originate with foreign
service commercial officers who forward the leads to the Depart-
ment of Commerce where they are processed and sent to subscrib-
ers.3 7 Interagency cooperation, such as that displayed in TOP,
27 Id.
" See Mullen, supra note 3, at 87. Eximbank also guarantees repayment of importers'
debt obligations which are acquired by United States banking institutions from United
States exporters against a portion of the commercial risks and all political risks. Id. at 89.
" Id. at 87. Eximbank also operates export finance counseling services, credit information
services for banks, and training and orientation programs for bankers and businessmen. Id.
at 93.
1 12 U.S.C. § 635a.
" See Mullen, supra note 3, at 60.
88 Note, Interagency Conflict: A Model for Analysis, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 241, 269
(1979).
38 Id.
" See Hearings, supra note 12, at 175.
" Id. at 184 (statement of William Edgar, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade
and Commercial Affairs, Department of State). State Department responsibilities are also
carried out through the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. See Note, supra note 32,
at 268.
Mullen, supra note 3, at 63.
a See Note, supra note 32, at 269. The Department of Commerce transmits leads: 1)
through its United States field offices; 2) through its publications, Commerce Today and
Commerce Business Daily; and 3) through direct mail contact with firms identified as inter-
19841
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helps the Federal Government produce a cohesive foreign trade
policy.88
Favorable fiscal policies and cooperation among government
agencies, however, do not provide the main ingredient for success-
ful export trade, that is, the ability of United States industry to
compete with foreign trade monopolies.89 Until enactment of the
Webb-Pomerene Act4" sixty-five years ago, the Sherman Antitrust
Act41 deterred firms from cooperating in export trade ventures.
The Webb-Pomerene Act exempts export trade associations from
the Sherman Act's antitrust prohibitions, 42 allowing the associa-
tions to practice monopolistic techniques abroad, such as setting
quotas and fixing prices, so long as those activities do not affect
ested exporters. See Mullen, supra note 3, at 63 n.34.
" Multi-agency activity in international trade has, however, been criticized. See, e.g., Ex-
port Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978) (statement of Fred-
rick W. Huszagh, Executive Director, Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative
Law, University of Georgia School of Law) [hereinafter cited as Hearing, Export Policy].
Professor Huszagh stated that the government structure pertaining to international exports
lacked the capacity to synchronize and coordinate in order to implement strategic decisions.
Export business activities are subject to several non-coordinated governmental demands.
The agencies responsible for export promotion are disparate in terms of chain of responsi-
bility to cabinet level personnel, legislative oversight committees, and bodies of judicial doc-
trine. Efficient coordination of trade promotion plans of the Department of Commerce, data
acquisition of the State Department, revenue collection of the Treasury Department, credit
services of Eximbank, antitrust enforcement of the Justice Department, and disclosure re-
quirements about marketing activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Department of Commerce is impossible. For a theoretical analysis of interagency conflict,
see Note, supra note 32.
"See Golden & Kolb, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: An American Re-
sponse to Foreign Competition, 58 NoTRz DA L. REv. 743, 746 (1983). "If small producers
and manufacturers are to obtain their share of foreign business on profitable terms, they
must be free to unite their efforts. They often face foreign government-assisted enterprises
and multinational, multidimensional trading companies." Id.
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1965).
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 1 of the Act declares illegal "every contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations." See
Murphy, The Export Trade Association Act of 1981-A Brief Analysis, 4 HASrINGS INT'L &
Comp. L. Rzv. 399, 400-01 (1980).
42 Golden & Kolb, supra note 39, at 747. Section 62 of the Webb-Pomerene Act defines a
Webb-Pomerene Association as:
an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and
actually engaged solely in export trade, or an agreement made or act done in the
course of export trade by such association, provided such association, agreement,
or act is not in restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint
of the export trade of any domestic competitor of such association.
15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
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United States markets, prices or domestic competitors."' Exporters
of services cannot claim Webb-Pomerene's antitrust exemptions,
and many manufacturers agree that the Webb-Pomerene Act pro-
vides insufficient protection from antitrust penalties."
The United States Government promotes international com-
merce through favorable fiscal policies and trade laws, but it never
guarantees the right to export.45 Governmental control of exporting.
takes the form of licensing procedures under the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979 (EAA). 46 A growing conflict among Congress,
the executive branch, United States allies and the exporting com-
munity centers on the EAA.47 Export controls found in the EAA
apply only after the President48 fully considers their economic im-
43 Golden & Kolb, supra note 39, at 748; see also Murphy, supra note 41, at 400-02.
44 See H.R. Rm. No. 637, supra note 16, at 12. Of the 150 Webb-Pomerene Associations
created since 1918, only 33 survive. Only a few of those still in existence are substantial
exporters. Webb-Pomerene Associations account for only 2% of all United States exports.
See Hirschhorn, supra note 4, at 748. Antitrust challenges to Webb-Pomerene Associations
have diminished the effectiveness of the Associations by creating confusion as to the scope
of the Sherman Act and the protection offered by Webb-Pomerene. See, e.g., United States
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (Webb-Pomerene Associa-
tions may fix prices and quotas and control foreign markets without violating the Sherman
Act). But see United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (antitrust protection of Webb-Pomerene does not extend to unfair methods of compe-
tition prohibited under the Federal Trade Commission Act). Cf. Hearings and Markup,
supra note 24, at 61-62. Webb-Pomerene has failed to achieve its purpose. Export associa-
tions today pursue traditional cartel-related activities instead of performing cost-reducing
functions. Id.
"' See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 12, at 116-19. See also Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192
U.S. 470, 493 (1904) (an individual has no vested right to trade with foreign nations).
" 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. V 1981). For a history of United States export
controls, see Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967).
,' See Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of
the "Right to Export" Versus National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 256 (1981). The EAA represents the most recent effort to strengthen and
streamline export administration, both in licensing and regulatory enforcement. Further
simplification is needed. See The Export Administration Act Amendments of 1983, Rep. of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-3 (1983).
,' Lurking beneath statutes like the EAA is the question of whether the President has
inherent constitutional authority to control exports, regardless of statutory authorization.
Nowhere in the Constitution is the President endowed specifically with power to make and
conduct foreign policy or to restrict or regulate exports. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
The President historically has exercised much broader powers than those suggested by the
Constitution. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 12, at 116-17. See also United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (with respect to foreign affairs, the Federal
Government is not limited to powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (implied
presidential powers fluctuate depending on whether the President acts pursuant to implied
162 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. [Vol. 14:155
pact and only as necessary to promote national security,49 foreign
policy"0 and economic welfare. 1 The controls extend to the export
of goods and technical data from the United States and to their
reexport from the country to which they are originally shipped. 5
Export licenses vary according to the category into which a partic-
ular commodity may fall.5 3 After filing an application, the exporter
must wait while the Secretary of Commerce thoroughly reviews it
and makes a final decision to either issue or deny the license." The
process consumes time and money which smaller industries cannot
profitably allocate to exports.
B. State Government
Federal trade programs may be inaccessible to smaller busi-
nesses which, due to their size, cannot commit the time and re-
sources to secure federal export trade services. State marketing ac-
tivities 55 provide those companies with the necessary support and
expertise at lower costs.
State foreign trade endeavors date from the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries when the Colonies developed transatlantic
commerce with other nations." After the Colonies ratified the Con-
or express congressional authorization, in the absence of congressional grant or denial of
authority, or incompatibly with Congress' implied or expressed will); cf. Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 452 U.S. 654 (1981) (failure by Congress to delegate specific authorities does not,
especially in areas of foreign policy and national security, imply congressional disapproval of
presidential action).
9 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404.
- Id. § 2405.
81 Id. § 2402(2).
11 Comment, supra note 47, at 268. The Office of Export Administration (OEA), which is
located within the Department of Commerce's Industry and Trade Administration (ITA),
issues two types of licenses: 1) general licenses-a broad authorization published in the Ex-
port Administration Regulations to export categories of items that do not require a specific
license application or document in order to be exported (a shipper's export declaration may
be necessary); and 2) validated licenses--a formal application must be received from OEA
before certain goods and data can be exported. The EAA authorizes a third type of license,
the qualified general license, designed to permit multiple exports under a single license to a
particular consignee or for a specified end use. Id. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(e).
"Comment, supra note 47, at 269. A commodities control list identifies, for each techni-
cal category, the country groups to which controls apply and what types of controls apply,
but only for those commodities which the Commerce Department controls.
" See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409.
"Prominent state marketing efforts include the Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 15.24.020-.900 (1971), and the Florida Citrus
Commission, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 601.04 (West 1978).
"See generally H. CARMAN, SOCIAL AND ECONOMC HisTowy OF THE UNITED STATES 158-68
(1930). The foreign trade of the Colonies rivaled that of Europe before the American
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stitution, trade promotion and regulation became centralized. 7
Growing trade deficits in the early 1970's, however, again focused
the Government's attention on the need for an expanded state role
in export promotion."
The economic health of small, locally or regionally based compa-
nies profoundly affects local economies;59 thus, the states have a
major interest in the success of those businesses. To create markets
for locally produced goods and services, states have expanded their
presence abroad in the form of trade offices and missions.60 They
also offer marketing programs which assist businesses in identify-
ing suitable sales opportunities, tailoring products to specific for-
eign markets, and developing an export strategy.61 States provide
trade development programs through agencies which give small
companies highly focused data on credit analysis and market op-
portunities.6 2 State departments of industry, trade and agriculture
generally have primary responsibility for trade development,",
often with guidance from the United States Departments of Com-
merce and Agriculture. '
Revolution. Problems which hampered post-colonial trade efforts included a lack of capital,
absence of a uniform system of money, and inadequate credit facilities. Id. at 165.
"" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Constitution vests Congress with powers which obviate
the states' need to engage in foreign trade. Congress can regulate trade with foreign nations,
id. cl. 3; coin money, id. cl. 5; and lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, id. cl. 1.
States, on the other hand, cannot lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except as
may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws. Id. § 10, cl. 2.
" See generally Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969:
Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1979) (statement of Rich-
ard A. Snelling, Governor, Vermont). States and their planning and development depart-
ments can play an important role in stimulating exports to the benefit of their own people
and of the national economy. Id.
11 Id. See also id. at 583, 585 (statement of Robert E. Mulcahy III, Chief of Staff to the
Governor, New Jersey).
" See Barovick, State Governments Build Bigger Export Role, Bus. Am., Aug. 24, 1981,
at 7. In 1976, 19 states had overseas offices. By 1980, 33 states had a total of 66 overseas
offices. Several states may share an office, or one state may have more than one office. Id.
81 Id. at 7. State programs are used primarily by small manufacturing firms with less than
five years experience in exporting activity.
62 See Hearing, Export Policy, supra note 38, at 18.
3 See Barovick, supra note 60, at 7. Maryland promotes trade through its Office of Busi-
ness and Industrial Development of the Department of Economic and Community Develop-
ment. Georgia's trade efforts proceed through the Departments of Industry and Trade, and
Agriculture. For a comprehensive study of Georgia's trade programs, see GA. WORLD CONG.
INSTITUTE, ENHANCING GEORGIA'S COMPETITIVE POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: A
WHITE PAPER FOR DEVELOPING STATE POLICY (J. Goodnow, J. Crupi & C. Mahone, eds. 1982).
See generally Hearings, supra note 12. The Foreign Agricultural Service gathers infor-
mation on export opportunities and funnels the information to state agencies. See id. at
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
As at the federal level, state fiscal policies influence export trade.
Foreign trade zones,65 industrial revenue bonds and job training
programs provide businesses with incentives to enter the export
market. 6"
Each state relies on similar programs to attract businesses, pro-
mote trade and develop a stronger economy, but economic
problems extend beyond state boundaries, reaching regional pro-
portions. In the past, states have successfully used the interstate
authority as a tool in combatting regional problems.6 The New
York Port Authority is one conspicuous example of concerted mul-
tistate action. Established in 1921 by New York and New Jersey,
the Authority facilitates trading activities in the harbor and freight
yards surrounding New York City." The Authority borrows money
and builds facilities such as bridges, tunnels, grain elevators and
marine terminals.69 It also provides regional trade offices and offers
services such as warehousing, documentation and market informa-
tion for export-import shippers.70
State and regional commissions, port authorities and local devel-
opment offices exist throughout the United States to promote
185-88. See also Barovick, supra note 60, at 9. The Commerce Department, through its
Office of Federal/State Liaison, helps states coordinate trade promotion efforts with federal
programs. Id.
" See generally Note, Foreign Trade Zones-International Business Incentives, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 669 (1977). Foreign trade zones are enclosed facilities into which foreign
merchandise may be brought without being subject to financial burdens imposed by tariffs.
Id. at 670. Public and private corporations can establish foreign trade zones pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 81(a)(u) (1978) and state enabling statutes. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 52-10-1 to 52-10-4
(1983).
States may establish free ports through which goods move tax-free. Localities within
the state may also issue industrial revenue bonds to finance construction of manufacturing
plants. See generally COUNCm OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, EcONoMic DEVELOPMENT IN THE
STATES 1 (1965).
" See Leach, Interstate Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
666, 681 (1961); see also Leach, The Federal Government and Interstate Compacts, 29
FORDHAM L. REv. 421, 422 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Leach, The Federal Government].
Using interstate compacts, states combine efforts to conserve oil and water, alleviate pollu-
tion problems, and conduct research projects. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 567, 567b, 567b-1
(1970) (pollution control compacts); 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (1978) (interstate cooperation and uni-
form laws).
" See Fair, Port Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CONrTEMP. PROSS. 703, 707
(1961).
See Goldstein, An Authority in Action-An Account of the Port of New York Author-
ity and Its Recent Activities, 26 LAW & CoNTEmP. PROBs. 715, 717-20 (1961).
70 Id. at 720. The New York Port Authority has trade promotion offices in New York
City, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Rio de Janiero, London, and Zurich.
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healthy exploitation of local and regional economic resources.7 1
Traditionally, these quasi-governmental entities have encouraged
outside investment in specific geographic areas." Enactment of the
ETCA offers states an opportunity to move beyond the traditional
methods of export trade promotion. The multistate compact would
enable states to form quasi-governmental nonprofit ETCs to foster
local and regional growth.73 The Constitution, however, limits the
freedom with which states may enter into compacts. 4
C. The United States Constitution and Multistate Compacts
1. Compact Clause
Groups of states within the United States develop interests, cul-
tures, interdependencies75 and problems which transcend state
boundaries and affect the whole region. They may wish to cooper-
ate in particular situations, but not all interstate endeavors require
a federally approved compact. 76 The compact is only one form of
agreement available to states.7 7 Its legal and administrative charac-
71 Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 1, at 245.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 245-46. These state-run ETCs could provide export financial and informational
assistance that local banking institutions are ill-equipped to offer, especially in rural agricul-
tural areas which could profit from foreign market development. They would also act as
"magnets" to draw additional small to medium sized companies to rapidly expanding areas.
See also Export Trading Companies and Trade Associations: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1979) (statement of Carlos Romero Barcel6, Governor,
Puerto Rico). State governments could decrease reliance on federal resources and foster a
correspondingly closer relationship between themselves and the firms which operate within
their borders. Including states in export promotion increases the number and type of re-
sources dedicated to exports.
7' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. "No state shall, without the consent of Congress ....
enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power." Id.
" See generally Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Ymum L.J. 685, 695-708 (1925).
11 M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALisM 19 (1971). States are
subject to judicial inquiry if their actions infringe upon or abridge fundamental individual
rights guaranteed by the United States or state constitutions. States are bound by their own
constitutions and statutes as well as by the laws, treaties, and judicial decisions of the
United States. Id. Principal vehicles of cooperation include uniform laws, reciprocal laws,
administrative agreements, various forms of informal cooperation, and interstate compacts.
See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, at 30 (1951).
77 Leach, The Federal Government, supra note 67, at 425. In addition to other informal
methods, see supra note 76, the Constitution provides two formal methods of dispute reso-
lution or adjustment among states: 1) the compact (art. I, § 10, cl. 3); and 2) litigation (art.
III, § 2, cl. 1).
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teristics make it a desirable method 8 of solving regional problems
which Congress can neither effectively" nor constitutionally80
address.
Compacts originally developed as a means of settling boundary
disputes in both the colonial and post-revolutionary eras." The
framers of the Constitution contemplated agreements among the
states which would not threaten the authority of a central govern-
ment."2 They incorporated what had been royal approval necessary
for valid colonial agreements 8 into the Constitution in the form of
congressional consent, giving Congress supervisory power and legal
control over multistate activities which have national con-
sequences."4
The Constitution, however, does not distinguish between inter-
state agreements lying outside the constitutional prohibition and
those requiring congressional consent.85 Supreme Court decisions
have added a judicial gloss to the compact clause, supplying the
738 See F. ZimmzRMA & M. WENDELL, supra note 76, at 103. The advantages of the com-
pact are its flexibility, its legal strength (especially its binding character), its enforceability
through the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and its superior position in the hierarchy
of state laws. Id. at 104. Five areas seem most appropriate for the use of compacts: 1)
boundary adjustments; 2) conservation and allocation of natural resources; 3) construction,
maintenance, and operation of joint institutions and provision of joint services; 4) construc-
tion, operation and maintenance of joint public works; and 5) metropolitan area planning
and development. See Leach, The Federal Government, supra note 67, at 444.
7 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 75, at 708.
" See Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 26 LAw & CoNTEMP.
Paons. 682 (1961). The range of federal constitutional authority has been given broad sweep
by constitutional interpretation. The areas in which state or multistate action is the only
available means of control, therefore, have been sharply reduced. Some situations call for
federal-state cooperation, such as river valley development. Id. at 682-83. The interstate
compact is a strong legal instrument for expanding cooperative federalism in situations to
which other cooperative methods are not as suitable. F. ZIMMzRMAN & M. WENDELL, supra
note 76, at 126.
" Note, Congressional Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J. 1416, 1422
(1966). Almost all colonial charters were vague and expansive. Boundary disputes arose
more frequently as the populations of bordering colonies began to impinge upon one an-
other. Id. See also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 75, at 692.
** See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 75, at 693-94. To protect the new Union and to
settle boundary disputes, the Articles of Confederation provided for an appeal to Congress
in all disputes over boundaries. The Articles of Confederation also barred alliances among
the states without congressional consent. These two forms of conflict resolution derive from
the pre-revolution practices of seeking Crown approval for boundary dispute settlements
and of appealing to the Privy Council where no settlement could be reached. Id.
" Id. at 694.
84 Id. at 695.
" See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 76, at 34.
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necessary distinction. In Virginia v. Tennessee" Virginia asked the
Court to nullify a compact between Virginia and Tennessee which
established without congressional consent their common state
boundary."7 The Court's analysis forms the basis of modern com-
pact law. The Court rejected the argument that the compact clause
prohibits all agreements between states without congressional con-
sent, stating that "there are many matters upon which different
states may agree that can in no respect concern the United
States."88 According to the opinion, the compact clause is a bar
only to the formation of those combinations which increase the
states' political power and which may encroach upon or interfere
with federal supremacy.8'
The Court stated that the compact clause does not clearly indi-
cate the nature of the required consent.' 0 Congress might, for in-
stance, give explicit or implicit consent either before or after the
states form a compact.' 1 The consent of Congress is generally given
to a multistate agreement either by legislation or joint resolution,
which sets forth and approves the text of the compact and adds
provisions protective of the national interest.'2 Congress sometimes
grants unrestricted advance consent or invites states to sign a com-
pact to further desirable regional and national objectives, provid-
ing that they submit the agreement for approval.' 8 Congressional
consent, in whatever form, means that the compact does not in-
fringe federal powers or jurisdiction."
" 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
87 Id. at 517.
Id. at 518. As examples of joint agreements not requiring congressional consent, the
Court cited agreements to fight diseases or their causes and agreements for the transporta-
tion of goods across several states. Id.
SB Id. at 519. The Court relied on the rule of construction known as noscitur a sociis to
interpret the meaning of the word "compact." Citing Story's Commentaries, the Court indi-
cated that compacts usually involved treaties of confederation in which the parties joined
together for mutual government, political cooperation, and the exercise of political sover-
eignty. Id.
" Id. at 521.
91 Id.
" See Celler, supra note 80, at 686. Congress has imposed conditions to protect national
interests in legislative consents. It may reserve the right to alter, amend, or repeal its con-
sent, although such reservation is unnecessary. Id. at 688. See also Louisville Bridge Co. v.
United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) (even in the absence of a specifically reserved right to
alter, amend, or repeal its consent, Congress retains this right).
" See Celler, supra note 80, at 686. Congress may also limit the agency created by a
compact to the performance of the enumerated functions and require congressional consent
for each new or additional duty. Id. at 689.
See Leach, The Federal Government, supra note 67, at 439.
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The consent question arose more recently in United States Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission." The compact in that case
differed from traditional dispute resolution agreements; it repre-
sented a widespread attempt among states to promote uniformity
in state tax systems." Congress had not approved the compact
which the appellant challenged. Applying the test of Virginia v.
Tennessee, the Court stated that "the relevant inquiry must be
one of impact on our federal structure." 7 According to the Court,
the tax compact did not purport to authorize its member states to
exercise any power that they could not exercise individually."8
Multistate Tax Commission reaffirmed Congress' role as guardian
of federal and non-compacting states' interests. 9
In Multistate Tax Commission the Court established principles
applicable to multistate export agreements. To avoid the invalidat-
ing effect of the compact clause, states forming an export trade
compact should conform their actions to the rules stated in Multi-
state Tax Commission and Virginia v. Tennessee.100 Since multi-
state exporting implicates both interstate and foreign commerce, it
may impinge on federal supremacy and state sovereignty.101 Con-
gress could, then, invoke the consent requirement of the compact
clause.102 The increased use of the multistate compact as a tool for
responding to regional problems will require a reconciliation of the
constitutional powers granted to the Federal Government and
those reserved to the states.108
" 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
"Id. The compact also prompted proper determinations of the state and local tax liabil-
ity of multistate taxpayers, of taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of tax re-
turns, and of nonduplicative taxation. Members of the compact included Alaska, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. at 454-56.
1 Id. at 471. The Court indicated that the compact clause reaches both agreements and
compacts whether formal or informal. Id. at 470.
"Id. at 470. The Court also emphasized that the compact did not delegate any sovereign
power to the multistate tax commission, nor did it limit member states' freedom to adopt or
reject commission rules and regulations or to withdraw from the compact at any time. Id.
"See Comment, The Interstate Grain Marketing Compact-Should Washington Be a
Partner?, 15 GONz. L. Rxv. 797, 808 (1980); see also Celler, supra note 80, at 684.
100 See supra notes 86-91, 94-99 and accompanying text.
101 See generally Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 75, at 718-29; Comment, supra note
99, at 808.
101 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. See also M. RMGEWAY, supra note 76,
at 20-24.




The Constitution grants Congress authority to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce. 101 Congress need not act to exercise its
power; the dormant commerce clause circumscribes states' com-
mercial regulatory role even in the absence of federal regulation. 105
Analysis of the commerce clause differs from that of the compact
clause since states may legislate in interstate commerce until an
actual impact upon federal supremacy over trade among the states
occurs.
a. Interstate Commerce
Discriminatory, self-protective and retaliatory state economic
practices which occurred during the period of the Articles of Con-
federation precipitated the necessity for a centralized commercial
authority."0 6 The commerce clause vests Congress with the general
power of commercial regulation in matters that concern the Union,
especially where individual states lack the capacity for effective ac-
tion or where they threaten to disrupt good relations among them-
selves through legislation.10 7 The commerce clause does not totally
void the concept of federalism. It allows, within limits, autonomous
state solutions to special problems not common to all the people
and states of the Union. 08
Early interpretations of the commerce clause spoke in terms of
absolute congressional regulatory power, leaving the states with a
limited police power over commerce, 0 while later interpretations
104 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 320 (1978).
Id. at 321. See also 3 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEaEAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
478 (1911) (letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell). Madison wrote:
Yet it is very certain that it [the power to regulate commerce among the several
states] grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing states in taxing the
non-importing, and was intended as a negative and preventative provision against
injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the
positive purposes of the General Government, in which alone, however, the reme-
dial power could be lodged.
Id.
107 Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 440 (1941).
I" Id. at 483. Customs regulations, maritime regulations, and the conduct of more awe-
some types of mercantile enterprises are areas over which Congress gained sole control. Id.
at 494.
109 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Court permitted states to
enact quarantine, inspection, health, and intrastate commerce laws even though such laws
might touch interstate commerce. See also L. TRmIE, supra note 105, at 322, 323 n.9.
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gave the states room to regulate commerce so long as their actions
did not conflict with any validly enacted federal legislation. 10 The
Supreme Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens"' reconciled the
two interpretations by allowing states to govern local interstate
and foreign commerce that did not require a uniform national sys-
tem of regulation. 112 Modern commerce clause analysis conceptual-
izes the United States as a free trade unit" which can endure only
if states do not practice discriminatory economic policies toward
each other." States have tried to limit out-of-state sellers' and
suppliers' access to local markets through legislation in order to
protect local economies."3 Protectionist laws of this type discrimi-
nate against interests that do not have fair representation within
the state, placing an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce. 1 6 States may validly impede interstate commerce to pro-
tect local residents from deceptive trade practices and threats to
health or environment."7 Unfortunately, the distinction between
unconstitutional and permitted state regulation is not always clear.
Given the concept of the Nation as a free trade unit, state eco-
nomic regulations which promote local businesses to the detriment
of interstate commerce are presumptively unconstitutional. Courts,
however, have treated regulations focused on preserving local em-
ployment, as opposed to profits, almost as favorably as laws con-
110 See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847).
1 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
'l Id. at 319-20.
' See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). Justice Jackson stated that:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free
access to every market in the Nation,. .. every consumer may look to the free
competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from ex-
ploitation by any.
Id. at 539.
I1 See Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wisc. L. REv. 125,
131.
115 See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (regulation prohibiting
the sale of milk imported from another state unless the price paid in the other state to the
producer was at least the minimum prescribed by the first state for purchases from local
producers is unconstitutional); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 525 (denial of license which
would help milk buyer export his product out of a given market held unconstitutional).
116 See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); see
also L. Tama, supra note 105, at 327.
'I See, e.g., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (certification of cattle imported into
state as being free from Bang's Disease not unconstitutional); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state program to purchase scrap cars in furtherance of environ-
mental goals does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce).
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cerned with health or other nonfinancial aspects of well-being.11
Production or price controls that affect interstate commerce also
do not violate the Constitution per se, especially when they coin-
cide with congressional policy in the regulated area.119 Undoubt-
edly, concerted economic or promotional activity by a group of
states encroaches upon the free market interests of nonmember
states,1 20 but no hard rules exist to determine if that infringement
violates the commerce clause. 21
b. Foreign Commerce
Congress' foreign commerce power developed as an answer to
hostile mercantile regulations of foreign countries1 2 and as a
means of ending inconsistent practices among the states, such as
coastal states' charging high tariffs on imported goods and passing
the resulting higher costs on to landlocked states. 1 2
In Gibbons v. Ogden,1" the Supreme Court asserted that the
power over commerce with foreign nations is vested absolutely in
118 L. TRmE, supra note 105, at 340. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.
520 (1959) (safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity and may be upheld even
though they may have an impact on interstate commerce); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945) (safety interests of the state outweighed by interest of nation in an
adequate, economical, and efficient railway transportation system). The Court has upheld
nondiscriminatory state regulations aimed at improving the economic status of depression-
struck farmers. See, e.g., Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Court struck down local
regulations ostensibly enacted to promote local health interests but which the Court found
only erected an economic barrier protecting local industry against competition outside the
state. The Court may have upheld the regulations if reasonable, nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives adequate to conserve legitimate local interests were not available. Id. at 354.
11 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943). In Parker, the Court upheld a Califor-
nia regulation granting the California Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission power to
control marketing of raisins enhancing or maintaining the prices by restraints on competi-
tion among producers in the sale of their crops. According to the Court, the regulations
applied to wholly intrastate transactions. Id. at 361. Considering all the relevant factors, the
Court stated that the matter is one which may be regulated appropriately in the interest of
the safety, health and well-being of local communities and which may never be addressed
adequately by Congress. Id. at 362. But cf. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925)
(grain purchased in-state without resale or processing was a part of interstate commerce;
therefore, state regulation of buyers held invalid).
110 See Comment, supra note 99, at 808.
"' See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 75, at 723-27. See also Multistate Tax Comm'n,
434 U.S. at 478.
" See Abel, supra note 107, at 466. The framers of the Constitution sought to increase
revenues from uniform customs regulation and to prevent foreign nations from shipping
goods through states with the most favorable commercial laws. Id. at 448.
12I ld. at 448-49.
12, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Congress, precluding the states from conducting foreign trade. 125
Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles12 expands the degree to
which states may involve themselves in foreign commerce. Japa-
nese shipping companies, operating exclusively in international
trade, owned cargo shipping containers which California taxed as
property within the state during a given tax period. The Japanese
Government also taxed the containers. 1 2  According to the Court,
when construing Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce, a
more extensive constitutional inquiry is necessary than the one in-
volving interstate commerce; 28 state action touching foreign com-
merce must not affect national concerns to any significant de-
gree.12 9 By examining the effects of state activities on foreign
commerce, the Court does not exclude the possibility of multistate
export trade; instead, it balances state and federal interests.
3. Supremacy Clause
If a constitutionally enacted federal law conflicts with a state
statute, the latter must yield to the former.1 30 The conflict may
arise either because the state legislation directly interferes with the
actual operation of a federal program or because, whatever its sub-
stantive impact, the state legislation intrudes upon a field in which
Congress has not legislated but has by implication reserved for ex-
clusive federal control.13' Individual states have entered the foreign
trade promotion field with some encouragement from the Federal
Government, but the Congress and the executive branch may resist
multistate export trade efforts as contrary to a uniform national
I" Id. at 85. According to the Court, states could not limit, qualify, or impede the exercise
of the foreign commerce power. Id. at 86-88. But see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 298 (1851) (local state regulation affecting foreign commerce is allowed).
"' 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Id. at 436-37.
i Id. at 446. In the first level of analysis, the state must demonstrate that the tax is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to services provided
by the state. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
I" L. TRIE, supra note 105, at 370. See also Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 451. In addi-
tion to the Complete Auto test, a state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce must
survive further scrutiny to remain constitutional. It cannot create a substantial risk of inter-
national multiple taxation and cannot prevent the Federal Government from speaking with
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. Id.
'" See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof
... shall be the supreme law of the land." Id.
131 L. Taim, supra note 105, at 377.
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trade policy. Formerly, the Supreme Court invalidated state laws
purporting to govern the same area regulated by the Federal Gov-
ernment.13 2 Now, the Court will uphold state police power unless
Congress clearly indicates an intent to preempt it through
legislation.33
To determine if a federal statute preempts state law, the Court
decides whether the state statute stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.3 4 The Supreme Court will not presume or infer a pre-
emptive congressional intent without persuasive reasons evidenc-
ing such intent." 5 In the case of a federal statutory scheme which
does not expressly exclude state activity, the Court has resorted to
a balancing of federal and state interests, upholding state regula-
tions based on legitimate local concerns.1 86 A regional export com-
pact might threaten the purpose underlying the federal foreign
commerce power, the uniformity of a federal scheme or the United
States commitment to an open international trading system, '
thus mandating the conclusion that federal law preempts such a
compact. Federal encouragement of individual state export promo-
tion, however, demonstrates a willingness to recognize a state role
in developing United States trade abroad.'"
D. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982
To remove exporting disincentives and to stimulate export ini-
18, Id. at 379. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 8-18.
133 Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 335 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). According to the Court,
intent to preempt state regulation is evidenced by- 1) pervasive federal regulatory schemes
which create an inference that Congress left no room for state supplement; 2) an act of
Congress which touches a field with a dominant federal interest, precluding enforcement of
state laws on the same subject; and 3) state policy which produces a result inconsistent with
the objectives of a federal statute. Id.
" See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (Arizona statute barring full discharge
of a bankrupt debtor directly conflicts with United States Bankruptcy Act).
" J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsrrrrioNAL LAw 295 (1983).
IU See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168-73 (1978) (where the Secre-
tary of Transportation has not promulgated tug requirements under federal statute, state's
tug-escort requirement not preempted by federal scheme).
I'l Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1980). The purposes of the statute
include fostering the "growth and maintenance of an open world trading system." Id. §
2502.
IU See supra note 64 and accompanying text. See also 7 U.S.C. § 1756b (1978) (United
States Agricultural Trade Office aid to regional export marketing programs). Any state or
regional export compact would be subject to the provisions of the Export Administration
Act, but this alone does not signal a federal effort to preempt multistate export activity. See
supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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tiatives through the formation of new export trading companies,
Congress began considering new export legislation in 1978.'s" The
Webb-Pomerene Act had not achieved its expected goals,140 leaving
many small and medium sized exporting businesses uncertain of
their antitrust immunity.14 1 Capitalization for export trade re-
mained a problem, especially for smaller companies, since federal
law prohibits banking institutions from having equity positions in
commercial ventures.142 In October 1982 Congress passed and sent
to the President an export trade law which encourages formation
of export trade intermediaries as a means of developing economies
of scale and low per-unit costs to facilitate the profitable export of
goods and services. 43
Title 114 of the ETCA describes its general provisions. Unlike
the Webb-Pomerene Act, the ETCA permits companies to export
services such as accounting, data processing and communica-
tions.14 , It also authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to establish
an export trade promotion office within the Department of Com-
merce "to promote and encourage to the greatest extent feasible"
the formation of export trade associations and companies. 14 The
ETCA recognizes that innovative and experimental export devel-
opment programs keyed to local, state and regional economic needs
serve an important function in United States export expansion.14
The Bank Export Services Act, Title II of the ETCA,148 amends
the Bank Holding Company Act of 19564 e and the Federal Re-
serve Act1 50 to encourage greater bank participation in ETCs.
Banking institutions provide financing and access to a wide variety
of economic, information, and communication services. 5' Only
holding companies, bankers' banks and Edge Act Corporations
may invest in ETCs, with approval of the Federal Reserve
"I See Golden & Kolb, supra note 39, at 754.
40 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
See Hirschhorn, supra note 4, at 749.
Id. at 748. This prohibition stems from fears during the Depression about the safety of
bank depositors' funds and their use in risky commercial activity.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 4001.
144 Id. §§ 4001-4003.
146 Id. § 4002.
140 Id. § 4003.
147 Id. § 4001.
146 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843.
141 Id. § 1843(c).
150 Id. § 372. This section makes bankers' acceptances available to small and medium
sized firms.
"I See Unkovic & LaMont, supra note 1, at 217.
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Board.15 1
Export trade certificates of review under Title I1153 protect
ETCs from antitrust sanctions. The Secretary of Commerce, in
conjunction with the Attorney General, establishes rules and regu-
lations for certification and issues the certificates. 154 Applicants
must satisfy specified standards found in the ETCA before the
Secretary can grant certification.5 Each certificate indicates the
recipient, the export trade, trade activities and methods of opera-
tion to be used as well as any conditions or terms that the Secre-
tary imposes. 5 6 Certificates of review bar criminal and civil action
which may be brought under the antitrust laws against the holder
so long as he acts in accordance with the stipulated conditions and
methods. 57
Title IV,' s the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
amends the Sherman Antitrust Act' 5' and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act'60 and develops jurisdictional thresholds for enforce-
ment of the two Acts.' 6 '
16 Id. at 217-18. See id. at 218 nn.75-76. A holding company is a bank which: 1) is organ-
ized solely to do business with other banks; 2) is owned primarily by banks with which it
does business; and 3) does not deal with the general public. A banker's bank is not affiliated
with holding companies but is an institution through which bankers may invest in export
trading companies. Edge Act Corporations are organized for the purpose of engaging in in-
ternational or foreign banking and other financial operations under 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631
(1976). The Federal Reserve Board, under 12 U.S.C. § 1843, has 60 days to disapprove of
any of the institutions' investments. It can base disapproval on one of three grounds: 1)
prevention of unsound banking practices; 2) prevention of materially adverse effects on the
financial or managerial resources of the institution; and 3) failure of an institution to supply
required information.
188 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021.
-" Id. § 4011.
"I The applicant must establish that its export trade, export trade activity, and methods
of operation will: 1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of
trade in the United States nor a substantial restraint of any competitor's export trade; 2)
not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices in the United States; 3) not constitute
unfair methods of competition against competitors in export trade; and 4) not result in re-
sale for consumption within the United States of the goods or services exported. See 15
U.S.C. § 4013.
1Id.
7 d. § 4016. The Attorney General may file suit to enjoin conduct threatening clear and
irreparable harm to the national interest. An exporter may be subject to private suit for
actual damages and injunctive relief should he fail to comply with the certificate's standards
to the detriment of any persons. Id.
8 Id. § 6a.
18 Id. §§ 1-7.
380 Id. § 45(a).
'' The Acts shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce unless such conduct
has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or on ex-
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Though the ETCA does not solve all United States trade
problems, it demonstrates a resolve to leave no stone "unturned in
the search for means that even marginally. . . expand exports.''
III. THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1962 AND
MULTISTATE TRADING COMPANIES
The major Japanese trading companies, sogo shoshas, provide
the best example for analyzing the effects that a multistate trading
company might have on the constitutional balance of power be-
tween the state and federal governments. Sogo shoshas act, in
part, as intermediaries, moving finished goods from one place to
another.' 5e They establish offices in many foreign countries, creat-
ing a communications network and an efficient system of physical
distribution.'" As dependable links in the chain running from pro-
duction to distribution, trading companies inspire confidence
among foreign dealers in the ability of producers to deliver high
grade, low cost products.0 5
Sogo shoshas achieve economies of scale by granting loans and
loan guarantees, supplying information to clients about foreign
markets, handling paperwork and documentation, and providing
warehousing and transportation. 66 Trading companies furnish the
manpower and financing necessary for export trade, consequently
freeing capital for investment in plants and equipment.6 7
Individual states, as well as private companies, provide services
similar to those of the sogo shoshas.'58 States, however, might find
port commerce of a resident competitor. See id. § 6a.
l H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 16, at 16.
1 See K. YOSHIHARA, SOGO SHOSHA: THE VANGUARD OF THB JAPANESE ECONoMY 218
(1982); see also A. YOUNG, THE SoGo SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING CO.uAmnS
(1979). The sogo shoshas also import and export raw materials, foodstuffs, and intermediate
and finished manufactured goods in a broad range of product groups. They own subsidiaries
which engage in resource prospecting and development, manufacturing and processing, con-
struction, financing, and leasing. Id. at 12.
1 See K. YosIHARA, supra note 163, at 218-19.
16 Id. at 220.
See A. YOUNG, supra note 163, at 58-68.
Id. at 68. Large-scale capital investment in production reduces production costs
through economies of scale, thereby increasing a manufacturer's price competitiveness. Id.
See generally Colairacovo, Export Development in Latin America, in ExPoRT PoLIcY. A
GLOBAL ASSEssmENT 102, 104 (M. Czinkota & G. Tesan eds. 1982). Since the cost of produc-
ing and marketing goods is too high for smaller businesses, these businesses do not enter the
export market. The major cost arises from securing support services such as financing, ware-
housing, marketing, and transportation. A multistate organization could alleviate this cost.
" See supra notes 60-64, 69-70 and accompanying text.
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combined regional export promotion more efficient. The interstate
compact represents a formal means of achieving this end; it is
more structured than informal cooperation among state export offi-
cials.169 Through a compact authority or commission, the states
can act as intermediaries for the export of goods and services from
businesses within their region. A multistate trading company ab-
sorbs financial risks170 involved in dealing with small companies
that private enterprises do not readily accept. The presence of a
governmental entity abroad creates confidence among foreign buy-
ers, encouraging them to deal with domestic exporters.
Multistate trading companies represent a novel approach for ex-
pansion of United States exports, but they raise several constitu-
tional issues which influence their formation.
A. Compact Clause
The initial question of validity turns on whether Congress must
give its consent to a multistate export trade compact. Not all mul-
tistate agreements require congressional consent;17 1 the nature of
each compact determines its validity. A compact that grants states
powers which they could not exercise individually necessitates con-
gressional consent.172 Jointly facilitating exports, however, does not
threaten federal supremacy to any greater extent than does fur-
nishing export services individually as some states do presently.
Congressional authority to regulate interstate compacts protects
federal supremacy and nonmember states' sovereignty. Judged by
the principles found in the Multistate Tax Commission case, an
export trade compact giving any state the option to join or with-
draw at any time safeguards these federal and state interests.7 8
The Constitution does not completely proscribe competition
among the states. 417 For instance, a multistate export trading com-
pany might attract export business to the detriment of nonmember
states. The compacting states could not, however, impose export-
ing standards on products and services which are more strict than
the federal criteria. The multistate export trade company should
only facilitate trade.
109 See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDALL, supra note 76, at 104.
17 See A. YOUNG, supra note 163, at 62-64.
See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519.
... See Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 473.
171 Id.
174 Id. at 478.
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Although a multistate export trade compact without congres-
sional consent may be invalid per se, Congress clearly meant to
stimulate experimentation in export trade promotion by granting
implicit consent in advance to the states.17 5 Recognizing the bene-
fits of regional planning and promotion, Congress gave the states a
signal through the ETCA that a compact is consistent with federal
trade policy.
B. Commerce Clause
Congress conceded that keying exporting activity to regional eco-
nomic needs and circumstances1 7 6 provides one solution for United
States trade deficits. Creating foreign markets for regional prod-
ucts through promotion makes local manufacturers and businesses
more productive. Improved production and distribution leads to
higher employment in the region.17 7 Greater profitability makes in-
dustries served by the export trading company more competitive
than businesses and suppliers in non-compacting states. This une-
ven competition apparently contradicts the concept of the Nation
as a free trade unit. The commerce clause does not absolutely pre-
clude states, however, from favoring local businesses,1 78 especially
when such action coincides with congressional policy or concerns
local welfare.179
A multistate export trading compact also challenges the Federal
Government's goal of uniformity in foreign commerce policy. Per-
vasive federal export licensing laws prevent the states from varying
the types of products which companies export or the markets
which they enter. The ETCA invites states to cooperate with the
Federal Government in export trade promotion, demonstrating
that Congress does not view state action as an obstacle to success-
ful foreign trade policy. Arguably, Congress may wish only to en-
courage individual states to continue their traditional export pro-
motion efforts through their departments of industry and trade or
port authorities. The ETCA, however, does not limit its scope to
local or state levels; it speaks of programs keyed to regional eco-
nomic needs.8 0
'75 See 15 U.S.C. § 4001.
176 Id.
177 See, e.g., H.R. Rzp. No. 629, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2467 (citing a study by the New England Congressional Institute).
178 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 119.




No federal trade law explicitly declares an intention to preempt
state export promotion. In view of the overriding concern for uni-
formity in foreign commerce regulation, Congress need only
demonstrate an intent to exclude all state activity from the area of
foreign commerce for such activity to be precluded. 18' If a multi-
state export trade compact interferes with the accomplishment of
Congress' purposes and objectives, then the compact is preempted.
One congressional objective is the development of free world
trade.18 Multistate trading companies represent a form of monop-
oly which conflicts with open market, free world trade. While ac-
knowledging the advantages of free world trade, Congress has fa-
vored the expansion of opportunities for United States commerce
in international trade.' 83 The Federal Government cooperates with
individual states to promote export trade and now has demon-
strated a willingness to foster the development of multistate export
activities. Although the ETCA does not completely preclude the
possibility of federal preemption, it does offer states room to ex-
periment in export promotion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The goals stated in the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
lend credence to the presumption that Congress invites multistate
participation in an expanded federal export trade policy. The
United States economy is an economic whole made up of many
regional economic parts. By encouraging regional export promo-
tion, the ETCA facilitates the achievement of economies of scale
and lower costs by small and medium sized producers and export-
ers. Fostering regional export activity improves the overall United
States trade balance and employment figures.
Multistate trading companies, established by compacts, could
complement the goals expressed in the ETCA. Explicit consent for
such projects may not be necessary since Congress has already rec-
ognized the role that innovative export programs can play in ex-
port trade. The multistate trading company should act only as an
intermediary, easing the movement of finished products into for-
eign markets. In this intermediate role the company would be less
"'3 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
18 19 U.S.C. § 2502(2).
.88 Id. § 2502(3).
1984]
180 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 14:155
likely to unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce or to con-
travene United States foreign trade policy. Through the multistate
trading company, states can supply more efficiently and at a lower
cost the same services to exporters that they currently provide
with the Federal Government's encouragement on an individual
basis.
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